Résumés
The paper discusses Raymond Boudon’s theory of ordinary rationality as well as his assessment of the so-called “analytical sociology”. On the first point, the paper argues that, in order to combine the realism of an unconstrained conception of rationality with the ex-ante facto predictive power of the narrow version of rational choice theory, we should better understand the relation between potentially triggering events and the actor’s “reasons”. Heuristics, social identity, and emotions are regarded as good candidates to advance in that direction. On the second point, the paper recalls some factual elements suggesting that Boudon’s assessment of analytical sociology is excessively severe and explains why some analytical sociologists are right in devoting especial attention to computational modelling.
L’article discute la théorie de la rationalité ordinaire défendue par Raymond Boudon ainsi que son évaluation de la sociologie dite « analytique ». Sur le premier point, l’article suggère que la littérature sur les heuristiques, l’identité sociale et les émotions peut aider à construire une théorie de l’action rationnelle élargie qui ne perde pas le pouvoir prédictif ex-ante facto propre à la théorie restreinte du choix rational. Sur le second point, l’article suggère que Raymond Boudon porte un jugement excessivement sévère sur la sociologie analytique et explique pourquoi certains sociologues analytiques ont des raisons fortes d’attribuer autant d’importance à la simulation informatique à base d’agents.
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Plan
Introduction
1. What we can (not) do with Boudon’s Theory of Ordinary Rationality
2. Three classes of “reason triggers”
2.1. Reason-based explanations and “heuristics”
2.2. Reason-based explanations and “social identity”
2.3. Reason-based explanations and “emotions”
2.4. The argument in a nutshell and Boudon’s expected reply
3. Boudon and Analytical Sociology
3.1. Are Analytical Sociologists Really Myopic ?
3.2. Do Analytical Sociologists have good reasons to be Technique-Addicted ?
Conclusion
Aperçu du texte
One of the most important findings in the contemporary philosophy of social sciences is that the materially constrained pursuit of single-minded self-interests is far from being the only way in which human rationality, hence rational action, can be conceived (see Searle, 2001). In social sciences, this fact is well reflected by the plurality of forms that, despite its apparently unifying label, the theory of rational choice has assumed over the years (Goldthorpe, 1998). This heterogeneity expresses a progressive shift from the narrow to the broad conceptions of rational action. According to the latter, all kinds of desires and constraints are admitted, full information is no longer assumed, and actors’ subjectivity in constraint perception is crucial (Opp, 1999). This move away from the narrow versions of rational action theory is partly due to the lack of empirical support for its core micro-level assumptions – where experimental psychology (Shafir and LeBoeuf, 2002) an...
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Référence électronique
Gianluca Manzo, « Reason-based explanations and analytical sociology », Revue européenne des sciences sociales [En ligne], 50-2 | 2012, mis en ligne le 01 janvier 2016, consulté le 25 mai 2013. URL : http://ress.revues.org/2231 ; DOI : 10.4000/ress.2231
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